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Are Consumer Decision-Making Phenomena a 
Fourth Market Failure? 
 
1. Introduction 
Advances in behavioural economics and related disciplines have generated debates among 
those interested in consumer and competition policy. Specifically, many of the empirical 
findings unearthed by the behavioural approach to economics question the assumptions and 
applicability of orthodox (neo-classical) competitive market models. Consequently, they 
appear to have implications for policies that rely on such models for guidance (e.g., Bennett 
et al. 2010; Garcés 2010; Rosch 2010). These findings hence represent a new twist in the 
long-running argument about the extent of desirable intervention in markets (e.g., Micklitz 
et al. 2011; Salinger 2010; Sunstein 2011). Among the issues raised is whether information-
based remedies for deficiencies are likely to improve welfare or merely place additional 
burdens on market participants for little return (Faure and Luth 2011; Sunstein 2011). 
The present paper makes a contribution to this growing literature by challenging a specific 
conceptualisation of behavioural economic phenomena that violate orthodox 
microeconomic consumer theory. It is becoming increasingly common among academics and 
policymakers to conceptualise such behavioural phenomena as an additional form of market 
failure. Bennett et al. (2010, p. 115) state that, “…arguably, behavioural biases can be 
viewed simply as a fourth type of market failure”, to be listed alongside externalities, market 
power and asymmetric information. Shogren and Taylor (2008; also Shogren 2012) introduce 
what they call “behavioural failure” when discussing environmental regulation, making an 
explicit parallel to the concept of market failure. Bar-Gill (2008) has coined the term 
“behavioural market failure” to emphasise the potential negative welfare effects of such 
phenomena in consumer markets. This term has also been adopted by Sunstein (2013). 
Similarly, in the UK Government Economic Service’s guide for members, Behavioural 
Economics: A Guide for Economists in Government, the role of behavioural economics in 
market failure is labelled “rationality failure”. 
The present paper argues that there are dangers in conceptualising the relevant behavioural 
phenomena as additional forms of market failure and, hence, that it may be unhelpful for 
policymakers to think of the relevant behavioural phenomena in this way. The central 
argument can be stated as follows. The concept of market failure elevates the standard 
competitive market model to the status of an ideal. Analysts and policymakers can use the 
theoretical framework both to identify departures from this ideal and to deduce what 
direction policy might take to move back towards it. They are assisted by a substantial body 
of scholarship that has generated formalised models of market failures and associated 
corrections. In contrast, although many behavioural phenomena also constitute departures 
from the orthodox model, rather than providing direction to policy within this deductive 
theoretical framework, the findings question the legitimacy for policy analysis of the 
framework itself. Various empirically robust behavioural results present challenges to 
consumer and competition policy that the market failure framework was not designed to 
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address and about which it cannot provide clear policy direction. The specific challenges 
highlighted in the present paper relate to the ability of policymakers to identify normative 
preferences and the implications of behavioural phenomena for the distributional 
consequences of policy. The intractability of these issues within the market failure 
framework means that to list the relevant behavioural phenomena as an additional market 
failure is potentially to misunderstand their likely policy implications. 
For ease of exposition, the paper employs a detailed example in the form of a particular 
challenge currently facing consumer and competition policy in telecommunications markets. 
Evidence has accumulated to suggest that “three-part tariffs”, which are widespread in 
mobile telephone and residential broadband markets, exploit established behavioural 
phenomena and result in significant consumer detriment (Bar-Gill and Stone 2009; Grubb 
2009; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). Whether and how policymakers might intervene in these 
markets in an effort to reduce this detriment provides a relevant case study for the 
discussion.          
Section 2 first revisits the long-standing concept of market failure, noting that throughout its 
evolution the aim has been both to identify and to correct market failures by reference to an 
idealised model. Section 3 describes the three-part tariff problem, arguing that it exemplifies 
the policy challenges posed by behavioural economics and illustrating why the market 
failure framework does not provide clear policy direction. Section 4 generalises the 
argument by showing how the alternative scientific method employed in behavioural 
economics delivers findings that themselves undermine the market failure framework. 
Section 5 concludes and considers other ways that policymakers might conceptualise and 
respond to the relevant behavioural phenomena.   
 
2. The Market failure Framework 
The argument to be presented in part rests on how and why the concept of market failure 
evolved and how it has come to be used. This section shows that even prior to the marginal 
revolution in economics, the concept was directed at both the identification of and, crucially, 
the correction of departures from an idealised allocation system. The study of established 
market failures within economic theory has always relied and continues to rely primarily on 
deductive theory that aims to inform both diagnosis and treatment, subject to limitations of 
cost.     
2.1 Market Failure in the History of Economic Thought 
The concept of market failure can be traced back to nineteenth century classical economics. 
As documented by Robbins (1952), far from being conservative supporters of a free-market 
system, the classical economists were reformers intent on directing economic policy for the 
benefit of wider society. They held that the wellbeing of society as a whole would be 
advanced by free consumer choice within a market system in which producers also had 
freedom, subject to regulation by government to protect such freedom. Within this 
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tradition, the writings of John Stuart Mill in the mid-nineteenth century began an 
identifiable intellectual effort to define more precisely the legitimate extent of state 
intervention in the market. As Medema (2007) shows, Mill (1848) broke away from the 
classical tradition by identifying many cases of what came to be understood as examples of 
two of the three standard market failures studied in micro-economics: externalities 
(including public goods) and market power. Mill’s analysis included examples relating to the 
consumer policy of the time, such as the state’s role in establishing a standard set of weights 
and measures to alleviate buyers’ difficulties when assessing quantities. For present 
purposes, the key point is that from its inception the analysis of market failures aimed to 
categorise departures from the ideal model and to deduce possible interventions to return 
the system to an ideal state, or what Mill called the “system of natural liberty”. 
This conceptualisation of market failure and the motivations for studying it continued 
through the turn of the twentieth century, notably in the work of the Cambridge School of 
Economics, which introduced analytical rigour and mathematics to the study of market 
failure (O’Donnell, 1979). While empirical examples and case studies were extensively 
discussed in the literature of the time, following the marginal revolution the primary 
scientific method employed was deductive. The efficiency of the market system was 
deduced from formalised assumptions. Instances were then analysed where certain 
assumptions did not hold and Pareto optimal outcomes did not obtain, allowing the further 
deduction of potential policy measures to correct the failure and return the model to its 
idealised form or, in later work, to a second best level of efficiency (Lipsey and Lancaster 
1956). Perhaps the most celebrated early example is the Pigouvian tax as an antidote for 
externalities (Pigou 1920).  
2.2 Three Standard Market Failures 
While market failures may happen for a great number of reasons, on the assumption that 
public goods are considered a special case of externalities, orthodox microeconomics equips 
analysts and policymakers to identify and address three broad categories: externalities, 
market power and information asymmetry. It is for this reason that Bennett et al. (2010) 
contend that various behavioural phenomena constitute a “fourth type of market failure”. 
With respect to information asymmetry, the same deductive scientific method characterised 
the initial analysis in the late 1960s and early 1970s as had previously been applied to 
externalities and market power. The breakthrough studies that changed understanding (e.g., 
Akerlof 1970) introduced an assumption of asymmetric information into standard 
equilibrium models, which by then had a highly formalised neoclassical flavour, and deduced 
suboptimal outcomes and potential solutions for restoring Pareto efficiency. The analysis 
proceeded via theoretical deduction, with the introduction of asymmetric information 
justified through casual observation, before seeking real world application and empirical 
tests to establish the extent of the identified market failure or the prevalence of efforts by 
market participants and authorities to combat information asymmetry (Stiglitz 2000).  
Thus, while the market failure framework has developed over a period of more than a 
century and a half, the methodological approach has been consistent. A deductive model of 
5 
an efficient market is the starting point. The assumptions of the model are then tweaked to 
reflect potentially important properties of real markets. The efficiency properties of the 
model are reassessed and, where efficiency failures are identified, further deductions 
suggest possible corrections that might restore optimality or result in a second best level of 
efficiency. The elements of now standard policy solutions to market failures flow from such 
deductive analysis. Externalities can be removed by completing the market and pricing them 
in, or neutralised by taxing them at the efficient level. Market power can be addressed by 
preventing collusion and removing barriers to entry. Information asymmetry can be tackled 
by requiring accurate disclosure, improving access and policing product descriptions and 
quality guarantees. These solutions are born of the market failure framework in which it can 
be deduced that they will direct the market back towards the ideal competitive model.   
2.3 Linking Behavioural Economics to Market Failure 
Part of the impetus to describe and conceptualise relevant behavioural phenomena as 
market failures is to get them taken seriously by those whose instinct is to caution against 
excessive government intervention. An example is Bar-Gill (2008), who outlines evidence for 
“behavioural market failures” in credit card markets, where some consumers fail to make 
beneficial switches to lower cost cards and some simultaneously hold credit card debt that 
bears high interest and savings that earn much lower interest. Bar-Gill asks why detailed 
factual inquiry and legal intervention are not employed to address these market failures, just 
as they are when the market failure results from monopoly and collusion. Similarly, Sunstein 
(2013, p. 39) posits that behavioural market failures “supplement the standard (welfarist) 
justifications for government action”. Indeed, many behavioural phenomena can be linked 
to one or more violations of the orthodox competitive market model, thereby implying that 
in a market where such phenomena persist a deduction of efficient allocation is invalid.  
Yet, as demonstrated above, the market failure framework was developed to do more than 
list violations of perfect efficiency. The framework presents an ideal to aim for and is 
designed to allow the analyst or policymaker to deduce a direction for policy that shifts 
allocation back towards this ideal. This aspect of the market failure framework is recognised 
also by Shogren (2012, p. 350), who uses the term “behavioural failure” in a parallel sense to 
market failure to “stress the normative notion in behavioural economics that society can ‘fix’ 
these failures given some third-party expert who knows the optimal outcome and can create 
cues and nudge people toward that outcome”. It is at this point, when the analyst or 
policymaker turns to the market failure framework to make deductions about potential 
policies, that various behavioural phenomena become troublesome. From the outset, it is 
with noting that while the three standard market failures were first investigated by scholars 
via the deductive method, the relevant behavioural phenomena were not. Arguably, 
therefore, we might expect these phenomena to have some distinctive properties. Before 
pursuing this further in a generalised analysis, however, a concrete case study helps to 
clarify the nature of the problem.         
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3. Case Study: Three-Part Tariffs in Telecommunications 
“Three-part tariffs” consist of a fixed fee in return for a specified level of service up to a limit, 
beyond which additional charges are levied. Applying these tariffs to mobile telephone and 
broadband services, consumers pay for an allowance of units of the product (calls, text 
messages and/or megabytes of data), supplied at zero marginal price, while any units 
consumed beyond the allowance are charged at a positive (usually much higher) marginal 
price. These contracts are widespread in many countries and hence appear to be popular 
with both providers and consumers. Yet there is good evidence that they result in a 
substantial proportion of consumers paying considerably more for the service than they 
need to.  
This section outlines explanations offered by behavioural economics for the empirical 
observation that three-part tariffs remain popular despite what appears to be substantial, 
ongoing, consumer detriment, occurring in competitive markets that offer consumers ample 
choice. It then considers the challenges raised for policymakers and the extent to which the 
market failure framework is helpful for conceptualising the problem and seeking a solution.  
3.1 Overoptimistic and Miscalibrated Consumers 
“Overconfidence bias” is an established phenomenon in behavioural economics, which 
manifests itself in two ways. Firstly, we are habitually overoptimistic in assessing our likely 
personal performance, abilities and outcomes. For instance, one classic and oft-cited study 
found that 93% of drivers thought their driving skills were above the median (Svenson 1981). 
Secondly, we are inclined to believe that our assessments of likely outcomes are more 
accurate than they in fact are, thereby underestimating the likelihood of extreme outcomes. 
Again, the size of this miscalibration can be very large. Ben-David et al. (2010) asked a 
sample of Chief Financial Officers to predict stock market returns and, in doing so, to predict 
the 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution. Actual returns stayed within the stated 
80% confidence range just 33% of the time. Laboratory and field studies of both types of 
overconfidence are reviewed by (DellaVigna, 2009), who finds evidence for the phenomenon 
among consumers when they choose health club contracts, credit cards and pension plans, 
and with respect to the judgements and decisions of both professionals and non-
professionals in financial markets.  
Recent evidence suggests that overoptimism and miscalibration probably help to explain 
data on consumers’ choices between three-part tariffs. In a study of 11,000 customers at a 
single German residential broadband internet provider, Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) found a 
substantial proportion had failed to select the cost minimising tariff for their usage pattern 
from a choice of just three different tariffs. The majority on the three-part tariff with higher 
fees and allowances would have been better off on a tariff with a lower fee and allowance. A 
smaller proportion of consumers overstepped the limits and paid penalty rates. Overall, the 
effects were large: the supplier was estimated to be doubling customer lifetime value from 
those not selecting the cost-minimising tariff. Similar effects have been recorded for mobile 
telephone tariffs in the US by Grubb (2009) and Bar-Gill and Stone (2009), with a somewhat 
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higher proportion overstepping allowances. Yet three-part tariffs remain popular among 
consumers. The most likely explanation for these findings, as argued by Grubb (2009), is 
overconfidence bias. Consumers seem to believe that they are in better control of usage 
than in fact they are, both underestimating the likelihood of going beyond allowances and of 
using too little of the service to justify the flat-rate payment. According to this account, 
therefore, three-part tariffs attract custom because consumers underestimate the likelihood 
of paying too much for the service at both ends of the usage distribution.  
Importantly, however, this combination of overoptimism and miscalibration is not the only 
factor indicated by empirical results; other part-causes are probably involved (Lambrecht 
and Skiera 2006). Risk-averse consumers may pay extra for insurance against high bills, 
although they may not realise the true size of the insurance premium they are paying. The 
“taxi-meter effect” (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998), which refers to an observed tendency to 
enjoy consumption more after paying in advance than when watching the bill 
simultaneously mount, may also be involved. That is, surfing, chatting or messaging may 
actually be more pleasurable when the marginal cost is zero. Lambrecht and Skiera’s (2006) 
survey evidence suggests some role for both the insurance and taxi-meter effects, which are 
consistent with the observed preference for flat rates, although perhaps not with contracts 
that include high penalty rates for exceeding allowances (Grubb 2009).  
Given the above findings, three-part tariffs raise clear issues for policy. Many consumers are 
paying much more than they need to for the level of service they receive, implying 
substantial consumer detriment. The prime suspect is a misperception, which while it is the 
subject of relatively recent and ongoing scientific investigation, is nevertheless already well-
documented. The available evidence indicates that providers offer contracts that exploit the 
misperception and generate additional profits from the more overconfident consumers. Yet 
consumers and suppliers alike willingly enter contracts with three-part tariffs and 
overconfidence is not the only reason consumers are willing to pay more for flat rates. So, 
should regulators act? If so, how?  
3.2 Representativeness as a Case Study 
Before considering the usefulness of the market failure framework for tackling this awkward 
policy challenge, a brief discussion is merited regarding the extent to which this case study 
exemplifies the sort of consumer and competition policy dilemmas thrown up by 
behavioural findings. As well as topicality, the issue of three-part tariffs has a number of 
properties in common with other areas where behavioural findings have led to debate over 
the appropriateness of policy interventions. Firstly, while the basic empirical facts relating to 
the failure to select the minimum cost tariff for a given usage are not disputed, the precise 
cause is not a matter of scientific consensus. This situation applies to other behavioural 
phenomena that have been observed in real markets and brought to the attention of 
policymakers, such as the power of defaults to determine choices relating to retirement 
savings (e.g., Madrian and Shea 2001; Poterba 2009) or online transactions.  The influence of 
defaults is easy to demonstrate empirically, yet it is unclear to what extent the effect is due 
to individuals treating defaults as advice, viewing them as an indication of what others do, or 
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simply sticking with the default through inertia or procrastination. Thus, the empirical 
findings and policy response are ahead of explanatory efforts, which are the subject of 
ongoing research. Secondly, modern telecommunications markets are contested and offer 
consumers plenty of choice. Despite the apparent presence of competition, the potentially 
problematic transactions are entered into willingly for periods of years, with many 
consumers seemingly unaware that they could be making much lower cost choices. Hence, 
policymakers must consider whether it is reasonable to conclude that the relevant 
consumers do not know what is good for them. Again, this implication is typical of 
behavioural findings relating to free consumer choices across a range of competitive 
markets, such as insensitivity to fees for investment products (e.g., Barber et al. 2005), the 
anchoring of credit card repayments by a prominent minimum repayment (Stewart 2009), or 
the impact of container size on food intake (e.g., Wansink and Kim 2005). Lastly, the selected 
case study is a consumer and competition policy issue that could potentially be addressed by 
a range of possible interventions drawn from current debates on the implications of 
behavioural economics. There are arguments for doing nothing, for mandating better 
information disclosure, for trying other “nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) such as timely 
or salient consumer feedback, for introducing price regulation (e.g., limiting the severity of 
penalty rates) or, at the extreme, a case can even be made for banning three-part tariffs on 
the grounds that price schedules with zero marginal cost are theoretically inefficient.             
3.3 Applying the Market Failure Framework 
The market failure framework was developed to allow policymakers and analysts to spot 
inefficiencies and to deduce potential solutions. Does it help here? It is not needed in order 
to conclude that three-part tariffs lead to potentially large consumer detriment. This 
inference requires only the assumption that consumers would rather pay substantially less 
for the same service, since the empirics suggest in straightforward fashion that consumers 
could be doing better. But does the market failure framework help an analyst or policymaker 
deduce a direction for policy?  
Following the same logic as applies to the three established market failures, policymakers 
might deduce that a good policy is one that tries to move the market back towards the ideal 
competitive model. Interventions might be sought to make consumers’ perceptions of the 
distributions of their own likely future usages more accurate. Regulations might be 
introduced to force suppliers to disclose their own estimate of the probability that the 
consumer will overstep the allowance (Bar-Gill 2012), or to send a warning message when 
an allowance is about to be overstepped (Bar-Gill and Stone 2009), or to provide one-click 
access to contemporaneous graphical usage information (Lunn 2013). Such interventions, 
designed to “debias” consumers’ overconfidence, might initially appear to move the market 
back towards the ideal competitive model with consumers behaving according to rational 
choice theory.  
There is, however, a problem with the logic here. To be effective, any intervention must 
alter choices. Yet how can the policymaker be sure that the new choices made following the 
intervention are better for the consumer than the previous choices? Note that where an 
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intervention successfully makes consumers’ perceptions of the distribution of their own 
future usage more accurate, this is not a sufficient condition for a welfare improvement. For 
instance, another established finding of behavioural economics is that decision-makers 
overweight small probabilities when choosing between risky prospects (Camerer and Ho 
1996; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). When this overweighting of small probabilities is 
combined with miscalibration, which reduces the perceived probability of small probability 
outcomes, it cannot be deduced that improving calibration with respect to future usage will 
necessarily result in a better outcome for the consumer. If, following the intervention, 
consumers perceive the probability distribution of their future usage accurately but 
overweight these small probability outcomes when deciding between contracts, they may 
actually end up making worse decisions overall, despite the improved accuracy of one of 
their perceptions.  
In fact, it is not valid to deduce that a policy intervention is welfare improving even where it 
is known that the policy increases the proportion of consumers opting for cost-minimising 
tariffs, because policymakers do not know the optimal proportion of consumers on such 
tariffs to aim for. Some consumers’ desire for insurance against high bills and their dislike of 
having the meter ticking may mean that they prefer to spend somewhat more than they 
need to for good reasons. The optimal proportion on cost minimising tariffs, therefore, will 
be less than 100%. How much less? An informed judgement is required of analysts and 
policymakers, but having accepted that some consumers’ choices of tariff diverge from what 
is best for them, we no longer have a criterion for determining the optimum and, hence, 
whether an intervention is unambiguously beneficial for consumers. Given this, we cannot 
deduce a welfare improving direction for policy even in circumstances where the policy can 
be introduced at zero cost.   
None of this is to suggest that any of the potential policy interventions listed above is a bad 
idea, nor that policymakers should shy away from intervening (cf. Epstein 2008; Bar-Gill 
2008). Faced with the empirical evidence, many people might conclude that introducing 
such regulations would be a good idea; the broad sweep of telecommunications consumers 
may welcome them. The key point is more general and relates to the analytic approach. The 
market failure framework, in the face of the three standard types of market failure, usually 
allows analysts and policymakers to deduce that certain policies are welfare improving, at 
least prior to comparing the benefits with potential costs. But faced with relevant 
behavioural evidence regarding how consumers make decisions in the telecommunications 
market, equivalent deductions cannot be made. Thus, the case study presented suggests 
that these sorts of behavioural phenomena are somehow different form the three 
established forms of market failure and, therefore, may need to be conceived of in a 
different way. The following section generalises and extends the argument. 
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4. Beyond Market Failure 
Scientific method lies at the heart of the analytical problems just raised. While the market 
failure framework exemplifies the use of the deductive approach to the investigation of 
economic questions, behavioural economics addresses economic questions via a contrasting 
inductive approach, more commonly employed in experimental psychology. The method has 
produced very many replicable empirical findings, the sheer volume of which make 
deductive welfare analysis intractable, at least at the present time and perhaps on a long-
term basis. Furthermore, behavioural phenomena force policymakers in the area of 
consumer and competition policy to consider normative issues that lie outside the market 
failure framework. Here, two issues are highlighted: the problem of normative preferences 
and the redistributive implications of policy interventions.  
4.1 Deductive and Inductive Economics 
There is no agreed definition of behavioural economics. Most definitions offered centre on 
one or both of two aspects: the branch of economics that contrasts observed behaviour with 
the rational choice assumptions of orthodox microeconomics (e.g., Wilkinson 2008) or the 
incorporation of psychology into economics (cf. Thaler and Mullainathan 2000). The second 
of these is perhaps more accurate than the first. To see this, consider a standard behavioural 
economic experiment where rational choice theory offers a clear prediction. The 
experimenter would surely not cease to be engaging in behavioural economics if, in the 
event, the prediction were confirmed. Moreover, behavioural economists increasingly test 
predictions derived from other decision-making models. Thus, although behavioural 
economics has produced many refutations of standard microeconomics, it does not by 
definition entail such empirical outcomes or require a focus on rational choice theory. In 
favour of the second type of definition, there is little doubt that psychology and 
psychologists have been foundational for behavioural economics. Yet it is not clear that 
psychological theory or even psychological insights are necessary conditions for making 
advances through behavioural economic research. Arguably, what behavioural economics 
has adopted from experimental psychology is not so much theory or insight as a particular 
scientific method (Shiller 2005; Lunn 2012). The salient characteristic of this scientific 
approach is inductive logic, based on extensive empirical observation and experimentation. 
For the most part, theory is rarely deduced from normative (or other) assumptions, and then 
indirectly tested. Instead, behaviour is investigated through more direct and open-ended 
empirical study. Potentially illuminating or relevant economic situations are subjected to 
controlled empirical investigation. Behavioural principles and models are then inferred from 
repeated observation and experiment – a process of induction.   
The use of this inductive scientific approach has consequences. Most importantly, as in 
experimental psychology, the method can produce very many significant empirical 
phenomena that are hard to unite through generalisable models. Thus, behavioural 
economics has established the existence of an extensive array of phenomena that influence 
economic decision-making, many of which have now been observed under both laboratory 
conditions and among economic actors in the field (Dellavigna 2009). For instance, should 
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policymakers turn to the established scientific literature for guidance on how consumers 
approach the purchase of retail investment products, they would discover that choices are 
likely to be influenced by reference dependence, hyperbolic discounting, extrapolation bias, 
behavioural convergence, overconfidence, action bias, choice overload, the focussing 
illusion, ambiguity aversion, inattention, framing effects and perhaps more. In at least some 
contexts, there is evidence that each of these phenomena, all of which generally violate 
rational choice theory, can have a substantial bearing on decisions. Behavioural economics 
has revealed that economic decision-making is highly complex, multifaceted and sensitive to 
quite subtle features of the decision-making environment. Behaviour may thus be poorly 
approximated by relatively simple axiomatic models, despite their merits in terms of power 
and generalisability. Instead, accurate models of how consumers behave in any given market 
may need to be quite specific to the particular context, with the strongest influences on 
consumer decisions identified by empirical study within the context concerned.  
4.2 Implications for Normative Preferences 
This understanding of how behavioural economic investigation proceeds allows the 
argument concerning three-part tariffs to be generalised. In many purchase contexts, 
particularly those the range of identifiable behavioural phenomena likely to affect consumer 
decisions is likely to be quite broad. In the case of telecommunications described above, 
while consumers may underestimate the likelihood of low or high usage, this miscalibration 
may be counterbalanced by the overweighting of small probabilities in decisions and the 
desire for insurance against one’s own future behaviour. Even this combination of influences 
is likely to be an oversimplification of reality, since other behavioural phenomena such as 
time consistency and reference dependence are likely to influence choice of contract (Lunn, 
2012). Thus, while a proposed policy or regulation might aim to “debias” the consumer, by 
extinguishing one seemingly disadvantageous aspect of consumer reasoning, it is not 
possible to deduce that consumer choices after the intervention will represent 
improvements on choices prior to the intervention. A clear direction to policy, as the market 
failure framework is intended to offer, cannot be discerned in this way.   
At the crux of this problem is that the market failure framework assumes, in the absence of 
the established causes of market failure, that the preferences revealed by consumer 
behaviour represent desirable outcomes. The framework is fundamentally premised on the 
notion of an ideal model against which a deviation can be detected and corrected. If an 
intervention internalises an externality, reduces market power, or rebalances an information 
asymmetry, then the market outcomes will move back towards this ideal. The preferences 
then revealed are assumed to be normative. Yet the broad and expanding range of decision-
making phenomena uncovered by behavioural economics undermines this premise, because 
it implies that in many cases revealed preferences cannot be treated as normative.  
In the case study considered above, it is the possibility of interactions between potentially 
counterbalancing influences on decision-making that make it hard to identify normative 
preferences and, hence, to conclude that the policy improves consumer welfare. Some 
findings of behavioural economics, however, show that revealed preferences cannot be 
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treated as normative for other reasons. Most obviously, revealed consumer preferences can 
be inconsistent. Dellavigna (2009) reviews a number of studies where consumer decisions 
imply inconsistent preferences over time or in logically identical choice scenarios framed in 
different ways. Beshears et al. (2008) provide further examples where empirical findings 
suggest that revealed preferences cannot be regarded as normative, because of passivity of 
consumer choice, complexity of the choice-set, susceptibility to systematic forecasting errors 
or vulnerability to marketing. To consider just one of these examples in more detail, if 
consumers change their choice of retirement savings plan when more options are added to 
the choice-set (Iyengar and Kamenica, 2006), which of the two choices should be regarded 
as superior? Should policymakers aim to simplify choice or promote greater choice? Once 
empirical findings reveal instances where consumers do not make decisions that are in their 
own best interests, the identification of “normative preferences” is problematic and, 
therefore, policy direction is unclear.  
Policymakers have the potential power to influence consumer decisions and behavioural 
economics offers insight into mechanisms that might achieve this. But unless they possess 
sufficient power to turn consumers into unwavering adherents to all the standard 
microeconomic axioms of consumer choice, whether such interventions are beneficial 
cannot be deduced. The evidence implies too many influences on decision-making and too 
much instability in revealed preferences for such a metamorphosis of consumers to be 
considered feasible. Consumer policy may influence decisions, but it cannot change human 
nature wholesale. 
4.3 Distributional Concerns 
Under the standard competitive market model, allocations are a function of initial 
endowments and relative prices. Agents differ in preferences and endowments, but are 
otherwise identical. The focus is on allocative efficiency. The first theorem of welfare 
economics states that under certain assumptions a competitive equilibrium is Pareto 
efficient, while the second states that, with some additional assumptions, any efficient 
allocation can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium. In the interests of efficiency, 
distributional concerns are relegated to consideration of initial endowments, which fall 
outside the scope of consumer and competition policy.  
The evidence from behavioural economics challenges this relegation of distributional issues. 
As described above, consumer decision-making is a complex matter with many significant 
and potentially interacting influences. Consequently, one might anticipate meaningful 
variation in decision-making skill among the population – variation that rational choice 
theory assumes away. If so, not only is the overall quality of consumer decision-making an 
issue for policymakers, so is how that quality varies across individuals. Indeed, while 
empirical investigation of individual differences in behavioural phenomena have received 
much less attention than the identification and measurement of average effects, what 
evidence there is suggests that variation in decision-making quality across individuals may be 
considerable and, importantly, not simply limited to differences between the majority of 
consumers and certain categories identified as “vulnerable”, such as children or older 
13 
people. For instance, individuals who are prone to one seemingly disadvantageous decision-
making phenomenon appear to be more prone to other such phenomena, i.e. biases in 
decision-making are significantly correlated at the individual level (e.g., Stanovich and West 
2000; de Bruin et al. 2007). These and other studies (e.g. Frederick 2005; Peters et al. 2006) 
also find that measures of decision-making competence are correlated with tests or other 
indicators of cognitive ability. While such a correlation is not inconsistent with the notion 
that certain identifiable groups of consumers might be considered vulnerable, it also implies 
that there is important variation in decision-making across the population more generally. 
These findings have further implications for the usefulness of the market failure framework 
for determining policy direction. The idealised market model has no variation across 
consumers in decision-making competence. Yet such variation means that policy 
interventions designed to help consumers to make better decisions may vary in the extent to 
which they improve average outcomes and the degree to which they reduce variation in 
outcomes across consumers. Which is the greater priority? Note that this is not merely a 
hypothetical problem. Return to the case of the three-part tariff. Policymakers might adopt 
Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) proposal for mandating companies to make available individual 
usage information in machine readable form. At the time of writing, a version of this 
intervention (“midata”) is being implemented in the UK. The aim is to allow those with the 
technical capability to use bespoke software to compare tariffs and choose the lowest cost 
provider for their usage pattern. It may turn out on average to be highly beneficial to such 
consumers, but to do little for less sophisticated consumers who struggle to employ 
sufficient self-control to remain below usage limits. Contrastingly, the more strident 
regulatory policy of introducing price limits on penalty rates might be a greater help to that 
minority, but prove disadvantageous for the average customer who stays within allowances. 
Deciding between these policies requires regulators to take a position regarding the 
importance or otherwise of the distributional consequences.   
The ideal market envisaged under the market failure framework suggests that policymakers 
should aim for a scenario where all consumers adhere to rational choice theory, which 
implies no variation between them. Yet, in addition to the difficulty of unambiguously 
improving consumer choices, given the volume and complexity of departures from rational 
choice theory, policies that improve some choices may increase variation in the quality of 
choices. Thus, one of the policy implications of behavioural economics is that policy may 
need to take account of substantial and probably enduring individual differences in 
consumers’ decision-making abilities.       
 
5. Conclusions 
A conceptualisation of the findings of behavioural economics as a fourth market failure 
implies that the standard competitive market model remains the target for policy and that 
correction of the identified market failure should be the policymakers’ aim. Through, first, 
the case study of the three-part tariff in telecommunications markets and, second, analysis 
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of the more general case, this paper has argued that trying to fit behavioural economic 
findings into this market failure framework may be unhelpful for devising appropriate policy 
responses.  
The inductive scientific method that underpins behavioural economics has produced and 
continues to produce a broad range of empirical findings of relevance to consumer choice. In 
at least some markets, the empirics point to many influences on consumer choice, which are 
often dependent on subtle aspects of the decision-making environment and may interact or 
counterbalance one another. In contrast to the case of externalities, market power and 
information asymmetries, this complexity means that deductive analysis based on a highly 
generalised model of an ideal market is unlikely to determine policy responses that 
unambiguously improve welfare. Thus, behavioural findings undermine the market failure 
framework not only by demonstrating that consumer decision-making departs in numerous 
ways from rational choice theory, but also by showing that the assumption that true 
preferences are revealed by choices may in many cases be invalid. The extent and 
prevalence of these departures from the orthodox model and of the disjunction between 
revealed and true preferences remain the subject of ongoing investigation. Meanwhile, 
behavioural findings also indicate that there is likely to be important variation in decision-
making capability between consumers. This implies that consumer and competition policy 
may have distributional consequences over and above those usually associated with policy 
responses to the three established market failures. In light of these empirical patterns, to 
conceive of the various phenomena uncovered by behavioural economics as constituting a 
fourth market failure may be to misunderstand their policy implications.        
How, then, might policymakers be encouraged to conceive of the findings of behavioural 
economics and to exploit the new knowledge they impart? One potential answer to this 
question relates to what lies at the heart of the matter: scientific approach. The complexity 
and sophistication of human decision-making is what necessitates the use of the inductive 
scientific method to investigate it. By analogy, therefore, the implication of this complexity is 
that analysts and policymakers might need to adopt a less deductive and more inductive 
approach to policy development. This would involve the collection and consideration of a 
range of different types of evidence regarding how consumers make choices in specific 
markets, coupled perhaps with a willingness to experiment with policy design itself. 
Beshears et al. (2008) list six forms of empirical evidence that, in circumstances where 
revealed preferences cannot be considered normative, might nevertheless give policymakers 
helpful insight into people’s true preferences: active choices made by engaged decision-
makers; asymptotic choices made by experienced decision-makers; aggregated choices 
across individuals; self-reported preferences; informed choices made by those with 
expertise or training; and structural estimation, where a model of revealed choices is 
estimated and mapped onto a normative decision-making framework. To these forms of 
evidence might be added others. Inferences might be made regarding normative 
preferences from how decision-makers respond to feedback, or how their decisions are 
affected by variation in the choice-set or the framing of choices. For instance, how people 
respond to the revelation of the gap between what they pay and what they could pay for the 
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same telecommunications service offers an indication of the desirability of their initial 
choice. A similar argument can be made regarding how consumers respond to realising their 
susceptibility to a framing effect. 
None of these types of evidence necessarily permits analysts and policymakers to observe or 
otherwise unambiguously determine normative preferences, either on average or with 
respect to variation in outcomes across consumers. Thus, the range of available empirics 
may offer only an indication of what is likely to constitute a welfare improving policy, 
perhaps on the balance of probabilities or with additional assumptions regarding the relative 
weight to be given to distributional concerns. For those seeking objective empirical criteria 
to determine policy, this level of subjectivity is doubtless unwelcome. But the main 
implication of behavioural economics for consumer and competition policy may be that, at 
least in markets where significant behavioural phenomena have been identified, a subjective 
judgement informed by a range of objective but not decisive empirical findings will be the 
best we can do in pursuit of welfare improving policies. Such subjective judgements will 
surely produce better policy the more they are informed by evidence. 
Recognition of this uncertainty over policy direction, where evidence suggests departures 
from rational choice theory, could usher in a more empirical approach to policy 
development itself. Policy experiments, pilots and (where possible) randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs) allow policymakers to observe the consequences of possible interventions, 
which cannot be deduced given the complexity of the context. Again, the question of 
whether post-intervention consumer decisions represent a welfare improvement may not 
always be answered decisively, but such an empirical approach is likely to provide 
indications and hence to support better policy decisions.   
Finally, since many findings of behavioural economics suggest that consumers sometimes fail 
to act in their own best interests, there has been an understandable debate about the 
extent to which policy responses might be legitimately or excessively paternalistic, in limiting 
or promoting certain choices (e.g., Camerer et al. 2003; Sugden 2011; Sunstein 2012). 
Although this important debate is not central to the argument presented here, it is worth 
noting that explicit use of empirics in the development of policy has the potential to allay 
fears of paternalism, at least to some extent, if policymakers publish all their findings and 
proceed in a transparent fashion. Consumers and companies may be more willing to accept 
policies that constrain or otherwise manipulate choices when empirical evidence of the 
likely impact has been accumulated openly and subjected to scrutiny.     
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